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The Impact of Firm Speed Capabilities on the Decision to Go It Alone or Partner 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study empirically examines the role of intrinsic speed capabilities, which refer to the ability to execute 
investment projects faster than competitors, in shaping corporations’ choice of alliances versus autonomous 
project development. Our basic premise is that firms lacking intrinsic speed capabilities (i.e., slow firms) 
are more likely to turn to alliances to supplement their capability deficiency. However, we expect that the 
ability of slow firms to partner with fast firms hinges on the former’s possession of complementary 
supporting assets. Our empirical analyses furnish evidence supporting these ideas using data from the global 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A core topic in strategy research on firms’ corporate development activities is explaining why 
firms choose to engage in an investment project themselves through internal, or autonomous, 
development versus through a partnership with another firm. Prior literature has focused on resource 
considerations for the firm and the project, with some studies suggesting that firms are more likely to 
partner when they do not have sufficient resources to carry out a project (Shan, 1990). By contrast, other 
studies suggest firms are more likely to partner when they have strong resource endowments, enabling 
them to attract potential partners (Mitchell & Singh, 1992). These studies therefore highlight demand 
versus supply considerations, and studies have begun to integrate these ideas using a needs versus 
attractiveness view, where firms use alliances to supplement a resource deficiency, but they must have 
other valuable resources to attract a partner (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Ahuja, 2000; Rothaermel 
& Boeker, 2008; Garrette, Castañer, & Dussauge, 2009). A recent study further synthesizes the literature 
by suggesting that resource endowments of a firm need to be studied in combination with product (or 
project) resource requirements.  More specifically, firms turn to alliances when there is a mismatch 
between the resource requirements of the project and the resource endowments of the firm (Garrette et al., 
2009).  
While we have significant conceptual understanding of corporations’ choice of alliances versus 
autonomous development, we know less about how firm speed determines this decision. By contrast, 
executives routinely invoke speed as a rationale for partnerships over other means of corporate 
development and investment. For instance, at a recent conference, the VP of external innovation at 
Johnson and Johnson indicated that firm speed matters in their decisions of whether to partner or go 
alone, explaining “we are a slow firm. We partner to go faster.” In addition, many projects are very time 
consuming and take many years, and numerous industries are characterized by capital investment with 
long time-to-builds, such as semiconductor production facilities, oil and gas facilities, and chemical 
facilities (Koeva, 2000). Thus, the ability of firms to execute a project quickly potentially figures into a 
firm’s calculus as to whether to take on a project alone or take on a corporate partner. 
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Several research streams could speak to the role of firm speed in the partner versus go it alone 
decision.  First, there is an extensive literature of empirical studies on horizontal alliance formation (e.g., 
Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989; Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Stuart, 
1998; Ahuja, 2000; Garrette et al., 2009). In a careful review, Garrette et al. (2009) point out that only a 
few studies have focused on the decision between alliances versus the autonomous alternative (Shan, 
1990; Mitchell & Singh, 1992; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Garrette et al., 2009), and none of these 
papers focused on firm speed. Another relevant prior literature is the extensive research stream on 
capability seeking in alliances (e.g., Barney, 1999; Ahuja, 2000; Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 
2000; Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, & Svobodina, 2004), which explores how firms partner to access 
the capabilities of other firms. However, this literature has not focused on firm speed capabilities and 
specifically on their implications for the go it alone vs partner decision. The broad literature on the 
performance implications of alliances is relevant as well. In a recent paper, Castañer, Mulotte, Garrette, 
and Dussauge (2014) interestingly find that partnering tends to lengthen time-to-market. This paper 
suggests there are substantial speed costs to alliances on average, but it did not focus specifically on firm 
speed capabilities as an antecedent to the partner versus go it alone decision in the first place. While firm 
speed conceptually should play an important role in firms’ decisions of whether to partner or go it alone, 
this area of inquiry remains understudied in the literature.  
This paper focuses on the implications of firm speed capabilities (or, for brevity, firm speed) in 
the choice of developing a project autonomously versus partnering. By firm speed, we mean the intrinsic 
speed capabilities of the firm, an idea in past competitive strategy research that captures the ability of 
firms to execute investment projects faster than competitors at the same cost (Hawk, Pacheco-De-
Almeida, & Yeung, 2013; Pacheco-de-Almeida, Hawk, & Yeung, 2015). Our goal in this paper is to 
develop and empirically examine a nuanced theory about how and when firm speed affects companies’ 
decisions of whether to partner or go it alone. Our basic proposition is that firms anticipate differential 
speed benefits from alliances versus the autonomous alternative based upon the intrinsic speed 
capabilities of the focal firm. Specifically, firms lacking these intrinsic speed capabilities (i.e., slow firms) 
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are more likely to turn to alliances to supplement their capability deficiency. Alliances may be a means 
for slower firms to try to overcome their own inability to move quickly in project development by 
accessing or acquiring the capabilities of partner firms. Consistent with this capability seeking argument, 
we expect that slow (fast) firms are more (less) likely to partner than go alone. However, while slow firms 
may want to partner with fast partner firms to access their capabilities, an important consideration is how 
slow firms can successfully bargain within the market for alliances to access the speed capabilities of 
other firms. We thus expect that the ability of slow firms to partner with fast partner firms hinges on their 
possession of valuable complementary assets in order to be able to bargain for a partnership with a fast 
partner firm. Empirical analyses of projects in the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry provide 
evidence consistent with our theory. 
Our paper offers several contributions to the literature. In broad terms, we identify firm speed as a 
capability that matters for firms’ decisions to go it alone or partner for complex projects. Speed has been 
investigated in recent competitive strategy research (e.g., Hawk et al. (2013); Pacheco-de-Almeida et al. 
(2015), but has not been given adequate attention in empirical corporate strategy research on the ways 
that firms enter markets and organize projects. Our arguments and evidence demonstrate that speed has 
important implications for such boundary of the firm choices emphasized in corporate strategy research.  
We show that firms value speed as a capability to access through partnerships when undertaking complex 
projects, and we also show how they transact upon capabilities via alliances in order to access the speed 
capabilities of faster firms in the industry. We therefore provide additional evidence for the needs versus 
attractiveness view of alliances (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Ahuja, 2000; Rothaermel & Boeker, 
2008; Garrette et al., 2009), and demonstrate how complementary assets valuable to projects allows firms 
to bargain on the market for alliances and access faster partners. Practical advice and articles on alliances 
have over several decades routinely mentioned the value of partnerships in fostering speed (Hamel et al., 
1989; Ohmae, 1989; Bleeke & Ernst, 1991), but we know of no systematic evidence of how a need for a 
capability in speed influences governance decisions, and so we offer an empirical contribution by 
showing how the need for speed influences firms’ make versus ally decisions. We also complement 
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existing research on speed that shows how this capability determines the timing of entry into markets 
(Hawk et al., 2013) by demonstrating that speed also has important implications for whether firms engage 
in external corporate development activities such as alliances rather than organic growth and internal 
corporate development.   
BACKGROUND THEORY 
In order to develop our theoretical framework and build up a set of testable research hypotheses, 
we first cover background theory across several research streams concerning speed in investment project 
execution, firm speed capabilities, and the potential speed implications of alliances. This background 
theory is useful in providing linkages between organizational speed and firms’ decisions to engage in 
autonomous development of projects versus partnerships, as we are joining together streams of research 
on speed and partnerships that have developed separately from one another in competitive strategy and 
corporate strategy research, respectively. We then develop our specific predictions regarding the role of 
firm speed in the decision to develop projects autonomously or via a partnership. 
Speed in Investment Project Development 
Speed in investment project development is an important part of the how firms develop new 
resources and grow. In particular, when firm growth is accompanied by large and lengthy capital 
investment, fast execution of the resource accumulation process may be particularly desirable. Speed 
capabilities in project development have many benefits. Faster firms can complete market entry sooner, 
thereby realizing future revenue streams as soon as possible. More generally, speed in various 
organizational activities has this benefit, whether construction of new facilities or the development and 
commercialization of new technologies. The ability to execute investment projects quickly may also 
enable firms to be earlier to the market and preempt competition. The benefits of speed have been a 
recurring theme interwoven in many general strategy topics such as dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, 
& Shuen, 1997; Helfat et al., 2007; Teece, 2007), first mover advantages (Lieberman & Montgomery, 
1988, 1998), and time based competition (Stalk, 1988; Stalk & Hout, 1990). The potential value of speed 
has also been frequently discussed for alliances, yet ideas surrounding the benefits of speed have been 
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emphasized in practitioner-oriented articles rather than in the research base of the field (Hamel et al., 
1989; Ohmae, 1989; Bleeke & Ernst, 1991). 
While speed in investment project development is likely to be desirable, it is also governed in part 
by time compression diseconomies, the theoretical phenomenon where project acceleration typically 
results in higher project development costs (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). There are several reasons for why 
costs go up as project development is accelerated, such as diminishing returns to allocating more 
resources to accelerate a project, information loss from parallel processing of activities that would 
otherwise be handled sequentially, and additional costs from attempting several concurrent approaches to 
find the optimal approach to accelerate the project (for a review, see Graves (1989)). 
Given heterogeneity in various firm capabilities, it is likely that firms will differ in their abilities 
to compress time and execute investment projects quickly. Some firms may possess intrinsic speed 
capabilities, an idea in recent papers that captures the ability of some firms to execute investment projects 
faster than competitors at the same cost (Hawk et al., 2013; Pacheco-de-Almeida et al., 2015). 
Intrinsically fast firms may thus be able to realize future revenue streams sooner, enhancing financial 
performance, and may have a higher probability of preempting slower competitors by having an earlier 
pick on favorable sites, inputs, and relationships with consumers and suppliers. Other firms, however, 
may lack intrinsic speed capabilities. For these slow firms, there are several disadvantages they 
experience. For instance, revenues from the project will be realized further off into the future, resulting in 
a lower expected value for the project due to heavier discounting of cash flows. In addition, slower firms 
also risk being preempted by faster competitors, resulting in potentially higher costs from late entry due to 
having a later pick on desirable sites, or later access to key suppliers or customers (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988, 1998). A recent study found a substantial amount of time inefficiency across firms 
(Hawk & Pacheco-de-Almeida, 2018), suggesting that many firms face these potentially higher costs 
from being a slower firm. 
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The Theoretical Speed Implications of Alliances  
As discussed in the introduction, alliances have long been mentioned over several decades as a 
potential way to organize economic activity that may help a firm move faster. While our focus is on the 
implications of firm speed capabilities for the decision to partner or go it alone, the theoretical ideas 
surrounding the speed implications of alliances can bear upon these market entry and project organization 
choices in the first place.  
Executives might expect speed benefits from alliances, compared to autonomous project 
development when making these governance choices for two main reasons. Most fundamentally, 
partnerships enable the firm to access the capabilities of partner firms (Argyres, 1996; Barney, 1999; 
Ahuja, 2000; Hitt et al., 2000; Hitt et al., 2004; Fabrizio, 2012). Partner firms may possess a skill set that 
may be needed and relevant to the rapid execution of an investment project. Rather than developing this 
skill set internally, the focal firm may be able to source these skills from a partner firm that are 
transferable to the focal project. A talented partner firm, thus, may be able to contribute to project 
development via its endowment of firm capabilities that help accelerate the rapid completion of the 
investment project under consideration. Beyond firm capabilities, partnerships may also enable the firm to 
access other needed resources needed for the project that they lack (Kogut, 1988; Zajac & Olsen, 1993; 
Mitchell, Dussauge, & Garrette, 2002; Garrette et al., 2009; Castañer et al., 2014). Various partner firm 
resources can be accessed and deployed to the focal project, which may facilitate faster execution of the 
focal project. Second, an additional potential speed benefit of partnerships may be potential learning 
benefits for the focal firm (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004). If the partner firm possesses a capability set that 
facilitates fast execution of the project, the focal firm may be able to learn and absorb these capabilities, 
potentially enabling fast execution of investment projects by the focal firm, which may in turn reduce 
time compression diseconomies or project development time for the current project as well as future 
projects.  
However, alliances also present several downsides such that firms are apt to use collaborative 
agreements selectively based on the benefits they anticipate from them.  For instance, relative to internal 
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organization, partnerships can present coordination challenges (e.g., Thompson, 1967; Gulati & Singh, 
1998; White & Lui, 2005), which may lead to costly mistakes and rework. The sharing of information 
across firms may be done less efficiently than withing the boundaries of an organization (Allen, Lee, & 
Tushman, 1980; Kogut, 1989; Williamson, 1991; Griffin & Hauser, 1992; Langlois, 1992; Monteverde, 
1995; Teece, 1996; Hatch & Mowery, 1998; Chesbrough & Teece, 1999; Leiblein, Reuer, & Dalsace, 
2002; Garrette et al., 2009; Qian, Agarwal, & Hoetker, 2012; Castañer et al., 2014). For instance, joint 
development of an investment project may require temporal specificity in the form of precise scheduling, 
timing, and coordination across partners (Masten, Meehan, & Snyder, 1991; Pirrong, 1993; David, 
Rawley, & Polsky, 2013). This need for tight coordination could result in delays in project development if 
one party delays activities or information sharing, whether intentionally for bargaining reasons or 
unintentionally due to errors in scheduling or executing tasks. Partnering firms may also not share a 
common language (Conner, 1991; Foss, 1996) or lack unstructured technical dialogue or other important 
interpersonal communication (Monteverde, 1995), and these communication differences and challenges 
may aggravate and impair information sharing and project development.  Collaboration may also lead to 
delays due to transaction costs associated with negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing agreements 
between the firms (Williamson, 1991; Parkhe, 1993).  Ex post adaptation requirements (Forbes & 
Lederman, 2009) may also rise with the technological or environmental uncertainties firms encounter in 
alliances, and the ensuing conflicts and renegotiations of contracts can impede the efficient execution of 
an investment project. In sum, coordination and cooperation considerations can make alliances costly to 
implement compared to the internal development of complex investment project. 
Empirical results regarding the actual speed implications of the make versus ally decision are 
limited, but one relevant study provides initial insights: Castañer et al. (2014) empirically investigated the 
performance implications of the make versus ally decision and found that alliances on average lengthen, 
rather than shorten, time-to-market. Note that this result is a mean result for their sample, but we also note 
that this does not suggest that all alliances are speed impairing. Our basic theoretical premise, as 
discussed in our theory development below, is that there exist differential anticipated speed benefits of 
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alliances across firms due to the capability endowment of the focal firm. Specifically, our goal in this 
paper is to develop nuanced theory about one kind of firm heterogeneity, the intrinsic speed capabilities 
of the focal firm, that shapes the choices firms make when organizing complex projects autonomously or 
in collaboration with another firm. We elaborate below. 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Firm Speed and the Decision to Go It Alone versus Partner 
To set up our theoretical development, we conceptualize the decision of whether to do an alliance 
versus go it alone as a choice of whether to enter the market for alliances or not. Whenever a firm 
considers the option of an alliance, a firm must decide whether to enter the marketplace for a partnership 
based on the potential advantages the firm foresees, and this assessment influences the bargaining 
behavior and terms that the focal firm might accept with a potential partner and hence the decision of 
whether to proceed with partnership or forego the market for alliances and go it alone. Given that our 
theoretical focus is the anticipated speed implications of the alliance versus autonomous development 
alternative, we accordingly frame the decision to enter the market for alliances as determined by a 
potential speed benefit analysis conducted by the focal firm. If the potential speed benefits are great, the 
focal firm will be more accommodating in the terms it demands for a potential alliance and will increase 
the probability that the firm chooses to do an alliance. If the potential speed benefits are minimal, the firm 
will be much less accommodating in the terms it demands for a potential partnership and this will 
decrease the likelihood that the firm will choose to do a partnership. 
We therefore first consider the role of the focal firm’s speed capabilities in the decision to partner 
or go it alone. The basic theoretical premise of our investigation is that this decision of whether to enter 
the market for alliances and partner, or stay out of the market for alliances and go it alone, is likely to 
depend on the speed capabilities of the focal firm. Most fundamentally, the speed capabilities of the focal 
firm are likely to shape the assessment by the focal firm of the potential speed benefits of an alliance. 
Intrinsically faster firms have an advantage relative to slower competitors in that they possess an internal 
set of firm capabilities to move quickly, allowing them to have a higher probability of realizing revenue 
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streams sooner and preempting competitors. For these fast firms, they are less likely to need to seek the 
help of other firms to execute the focal investment project quickly. When assessing the decision of 
whether to enter the market for alliances or not, the intrinsically fast firm is likely to conclude that the 
potential speed benefits of an alliance are minimal. More specifically, since the fast firm can already 
move quickly without a partnership, autonomous project development is likely to be more attractive in 
order to avoid the coordination burdens, potential conflicts, and other downsides of taking on a partner 
(e.g., Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Anderson & Dekker, 2005; Hagedoorn & Hesen, 2007; Hoetker & 
Mellewigt, 2009). As a result, an intrinsically fast firm would demand much more aggressive terms in the 
market for alliances, reducing the probability of a realized partnership, resulting in the firm opting to stay 
out of the market for alliances and choosing to go it alone. 
By contrast, for slow firms, the potential speed benefits of alliances are likely to be much greater. 
Since intrinsically slow firms are unable to move quickly on their own, slow firms are more likely to try 
to seek help externally to tap into the capabilities of other firms to accelerate their focal investment 
project. When assessing whether to enter the market for alliances or not, the intrinsically slow firm is 
likely to see greater potential benefits to partnering with another firm as a capability seeking mechanism 
(Barney, 1999; Ahuja, 2000), accessing the capability set of other partner firms to overcome their own 
capability shortcoming and potentially accelerating market entry. For instance, a partner firm may be able 
to deploy its capabilities to move quickly to the focal project, accelerating project completion. If the 
partner firm has a better endowment of speed capabilities than the focal firm, the partner firm may also 
teach the slow focal firm to execute project development faster at the same cost, leading to potential 
learning benefits for the slow focal firm.  In these cases, the slow firm can benefit either by accessing the 
speed capabilities of the partner or by acquiring such capabilities via learning through the partnership 
(Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004). Given these large potential speed benefits of an alliance, the intrinsically 
slow firm is likely to be more accommodating in the terms it demands from a prospective partner in the 
market for alliances, increasing the likelihood of a realized partnership, resulting in the firm deciding to 
enter the market for alliances and partner rather than go it alone. We thus obtain the following prediction: 
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Hypothesis 1: Intrinsically slow (fast) firms are more (less) likely to choose an alliance over autonomous 
project development. 
 
Bargaining for Speed in the Market for Alliances 
In the forgoing arguments, we suggest that slow firms are likely to prefer partnerships over 
autonomous development due to the potential speed benefits from accessing the speed capabilities of 
partner firms. A remaining question, however, is: why would any fast partners be willing to partner with a 
slow firm?  
Much of the alliance literature indeed focuses on what resources and capabilities a firm seeks in 
alliances (e.g., access to markets, technologies, customer relationships, etc.) without also giving equal 
attention to its ability to trade for these benefits in such economic exchanges. In markets for alliances, 
many sought-after firms have many options for potential partnerships, and the greater availability of 
options is likely to give these firms greater bargaining power (Nash, 1953; Ozmel, Yavuz, Reuer, & 
Zenger, 2017). The alliance literature has emphasized these issues through a so-called needs versus 
attractiveness view that should be integrated into in the foregoing arguments (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1996; Ahuja, 2000; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008; Garrette et al., 2009). That is, firms may want to partner 
to overcome a need, but they must also somehow bring something valuable to a prospective partner in 
order to successfully bargain for and attract a desired partner in the market for alliances to secure a deal 
for the desired resources and capabilities. Otherwise, contributions to the partnership would become one 
sided, making the partnership unattractive to prospective exchange partners. The needs versus 
attractiveness view therefore accommodates a focal firm’s willingness and ability to form a partnership 
and in so doing brings together demand and supply considerations in alliance markets underpinning the 
formation of collaborative agreements. 
The theoretical conundrum articulated above can be framed in terms of the differential speed 
benefit framework used thus far in our theory development. Specifically, a potential partner firm engages 
13 
 
in the same differential speed benefit analysis underlying the development of hypothesis 1. That is, the 
option to enter into an alliance is a function of the perceived benefits of the alliance relative to going it 
alone. Given that a fast prospective partner can autonomously carry out a project quickly without a 
partnership, the perceived potential speed benefits of an alliance are likely to be minimal, predisposing 
the partner firm to stay out of the market for alliances and go it alone (as argued in hypothesis 1). This 
logic suggests that, in order for a slow focal firm to ally with a fast partner firm, the slow focal slow firm 
must elevate the potential benefits of an alliance realized by the fast partner firm in order for a partnership 
to materialize. 
Following this logic, we expect that the ability of slow firms to obtain a fast partner hinges on the 
slow firm possessing a set of valuable complementary supporting assets it brings to a potential 
collaboration. Possession of valuable complementary supporting assets has frequently been shown to play 
an important role in many strategic decisions and firm performance (Teece, 1986; Mitchell, 1989, 1991; 
Tripsas, 1997). Furthermore, numerous alliance studies have shown that complementary assets play an 
important role in alliance formation (Arora & Gambardella, 1990; Tallman & Shenkar, 1994; Chung, 
Singh, & Lee, 2000; Rothaermel, 2001; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). In our specific context, we focus on 
a set of valuable supporting assets that are especially relevant for the development of the focal project. If 
these complementary assets are deployed to the focal project, the performance of the focal project is 
likely to be enhanced, benefitting both the partner firm and the focal firm in the alliance. These 
complementary assets therefore would allow slow firms to bargain for partnerships with fast firms, 
making the focal firm more attractive and increasing the probability of a collaborative agreement to be 
reached. 
Accordingly, we expect that a slow firm is unlikely to partner successfully with fast partners if 
the slow firm does not bring valuable supporting assets to the partnership. In these situations, prospective 
fast partners are unlikely to be attracted to a potential alliance with the slow focal firm, despite the latter’s 
need for a partnership for a project. Since the slow focal firm does not bring strengths that elevate the 
potential benefits for a partner firm, the potential alliance is unlikely to be viewed as mutually beneficial. 
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Since a fast prospective partner has many potential outside options for other partnerships, the fast partner 
firm is likely to demand exacting terms for a potential collaboration or rule out the partnership entirely. In 
these situations, the slow focal firm lacking valuable supporting assets will more likely be forced to settle 
for slow partner firms or go it alone rather than secure fast partner firms.  
By contrast, if a slow firm does in fact possess valuable supporting assets, the slow firm can 
successfully bargain for and attract fast partner firms to overcome its own inability to move quickly. 
Prospective fast partner firms will likely perceive greater potential benefits from the potential alliance and 
conclude that the likelihood of mutual benefit in the partnership is greater: the valuable supporting assets 
possessed by the slow focal firm have the potential to enhance project development performance and 
yield benefits to both partner firms. Complementary assets thus enable the slow firm to make a better case 
of its value-added contribution to a potential partnership and thus elevate the potential benefits to the 
partner firm and in turn lower the terms that a fast prospective partner might demand in the market for 
alliances. As a result, the slow focal firm with complementary assets has a better chance at successfully 
bargaining for and obtaining a partnership with a fast partner firm in the market for alliances. We thus 
expect that the ability of slow firms to bargain for and partner with fast partner firms in the market for 
alliances hinges on the possession of valuable complementary assets.  
In sum, we obtain the following prediction: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Valuable complementary assets increase the likelihood of slow firms partnering with fast 
partner firms. 
 
METHODS 
We investigate the choice between autonomous versus joint project development in the context of 
Liquefied Natural Gas investment projects from 1997 to 2015. Natural gas is predominately comprised of 
methane, and it represents an energy source often used for electricity generation, the heating of homes and 
buildings, and many other applications. Natural gas is found in a gaseous state, and it is often transported 
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via pipelines when potential markets are nearby. When pipelines are not economical due to large 
distances or bodies of water, oil and gas firms often convert natural gas into liquefied natural gas (or 
LNG) by cooling methane to -161.5 degrees Celsius, a process which also shrinks natural gas to 1/600th of 
its original size (Chandra, 2006). This liquefied form of natural gas can then be shipped economically to 
import markets via specialized LNG tankers and then re-gasified to be used by customers (Tusiani & 
Shearer, 2007). 
Firms participating in the LNG market invest in LNG facilities as part of an LNG “chain” 
reaching from export markets to import markets (Chandra, 2006; Tusiani & Shearer, 2007). In export 
markets, firms build liquefaction facilities, which are massive, highly capital-intensive plants that 
essentially purify and refrigerate natural gas into its liquefied form. To transport the LNG, firms own or 
hire LNG tankers to transport LNG and keep LNG cool to maintain its liquid form. In import markets, 
firms build gasification facilities, which are very expensive gas processing plants which store LNG, 
reheat LNG into its gaseous form, and then transfer natural gas into the pipeline network to be used by 
customers. Each investment represents a substantial commitment by firms. For instance, liquefaction 
facilities often cost over $1 billion, LNG tankers often cost more than $150 million, and gasification 
facilities often cost more than $500 million. Each investment also represents a substantial time lag in 
project development. For instance, liquefaction facilities often take 6 years to build, LNG tankers often 
take 2 years, and gasification facilities often take 2-3 years (Tusiani & Shearer, 2007). As a result, LNG 
investment projects represent an ideal setting to study firm speed and firm choices between autonomous 
versus joint project development given the substantial capital outlays required and time lags involved.1    
 
1 LNG project development is a complex process that takes time and may involve multiple parties collaborating with 
different roles. Tusiani and Shearer (2016) describe the project formation process as “a web of intertwined and 
interdependent venture and fiscal agreements, resource and cost assessments, and construction contracts (that) must 
be established. Shipping as well as buyer commitments must be secured. All of these must be brought together on a 
closely coordinated schedule. Project formation…is a complex, costly, and often lengthy process” (pg. 403). 
Chandra (2006) also emphasizes: “Taking a gas project from concept to operation is a complicated and lengthy 
process involving numerous parties with convergent and divergent motivations relative to the project sponsor….A 
project sponsor that can manage the process effectively will be rewarded with a project that is under budget and 
delivers the promised product on time” (pp. 122-123). These quotes illustrate that coordination is an essential part of 
project development, and activities assigned to different parties vary considerably across projects. As a result, 
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Data and Sample 
Our primary data source is LNG construction data from the Oil and Gas Journal. The Oil and Gas 
Journal tracks oil and gas construction project activity worldwide, and they have been collecting LNG 
construction activity as well. We supplement our data with the data collected on construction activity 
from Hawk et al. (2013), yielding a set of 370 projects from 1997 to 2015. After linking our data to data 
associated with needed covariates, our final regressions are based on 117 announced LNG construction 
projects by 31 lead firms from 1997 to 2015, of which 36 are joint ventures and 81 are developed by one 
firm alone. Our data are at the project level, and each project appears only once in our data from the 
perspective of the lead firm listed first on the project. 
Variables 
For our dependent variables, we first create a dummy variable 𝐽𝑉 which captures whether the 
firm decides to partner with another firm in the LNG project through a joint venture or to go it alone. 
Accordingly, 𝐽𝑉 equals 1 if the firm initiates an LNG project via a joint venture. If the firm elects to go it 
alone and pursue autonomous development, the dependent variable is set to 0. Second, we create a 
categorical variable 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 that takes three values capturing whether the focal firm partners with fast 
partners (𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 = 𝐹𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟), slow partners (𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 = 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟), or opts for 
autonomous project development as the baseline category. We categorize partner firms as fast or slow 
based on their realized values of the central explanatory variable 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑗,𝑡, where a positive value 
indicates a slow partner firm and a negative value indicates a fast partner firm. In cases where there is 
more than one partner firm, we use the average of the 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑗,𝑡 values for the partner firms to make 
the determination. We also conducted sensitivity analyses using the max and min values for the partner 
firms and found results consistent with our main findings.  
 
parties to a LNG joint venture may have pooled, sequential, or reciprocal interdependencies (Thompson, 1967; 
Gulati & Singh, 1998) in project development depending on the specific project and parties involved.  
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For our central explanatory variable capturing the slowness (or lack of speed capabilities) of the 
firm, we first estimate the intrinsic speed capabilities of the firm following the same method used in 
Hawk et al. (2013) and Pacheco-de-Almeida et al. (2015). This approach follows a similar intuition as 
past strategy studies focused on total factor productivity or efficiency, wherein a first stage regression is 
estimated to obtain a residual estimate of conceptual interest to be used subsequently in a second stage 
regression (e.g., Chung, Mitchell, & Yeung, 2003; Knott & Posen, 2005; Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006; 
Wu & Knott, 2006; Knott, Posen, & Wu, 2009; Balasubramanian, 2011; Rawley & Simcoe, 2013; Wu, 
2013). The basic idea is to regress time-to-build on a set of explanatory variables related to systematic 
determinants of time-to-build, such as the project type, region, and project capacity. This regression 
predicts the average expected time-to-build for a project, controlling for systematic variation across 
projects. We then use the residual as a measure of idiosyncratic firm speed. A negative residual 
corresponds to a firm executing a project faster than the predicted average. Similarly, a positive residual 
corresponds to a firm executing a project slower than the predicted average. We then standardize the 
residual and take the average for a firm across projects for a particular year, in order to aggregate up to 
the firm level to obtain a firm level measure of firm speed. Our final measure 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 captures a lack 
of intrinsic speed capabilities of the firm, with positive values indicating an intrinsically slow firm.  The 
lower the value of this variable, the greater the intrinsic speed capabilities of a firm. 
If we were to estimate this measure using LNG construction projects, we would face endogeneity 
concerns, inasmuch as our measure may be correlated with factors in the error term that are related to the 
choice between autonomous versus joint development (e.g., selectively speeding up or slowing down 
intentionally for either autonomous or joint development projects). To mitigate these endogeneity 
concerns, we first take the same approach as in Hawk et al. (2013) and use oil and gas projects unrelated 
to LNG (i.e., gas processing, petrochemicals, pipelines, refineries, sulfur facilities) to instrument for 
intrinsic firm slowness in LNG. The logic of instrumenting using unrelated projects is as follows: 
characteristics of oil and gas projects of a firm worldwide are conceptually unlikely to be correlated with 
a particular go it alone versus partner decision for a particular LNG project, consistent with the 
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exogeneity of an instrument. However, the resulting estimate of intrinsic firm slowness based on 
unrelated projects should be correlated with the intrinsic firm slowness of the firm within LNG given the 
common project management processes and cultures used by oil and gas firms in project development 
(Hawk et al., 2013). Using this empirical design, our measure of firm slowness should therefore present 
less of an endogeneity problem.  In a section below devoted to our identification strategy, we discuss 
other empirical analyses carried out to investigate the implications of firm speed capabilities for the ways 
that firms organize projects in an autonomous or collaborative manner. 
In particular, to estimate firm speed capabilities, we have assembled construction project data 
from 1997 to 2015 for non LNG oil and gas projects (gas processing, petrochemicals, pipelines, 
refineries, sulfur facilities) for 4656 projects. Our data for oil and gas projects (unrelated to LNG) come 
from the Oil and Gas Journal.  From this source, we have information on time-to-build, capacity, project 
type and location. Following the approach in Hawk et al. (2013) and Pacheco-de-Almeida et al. (2015), 
we estimate the following equation (with subscripts 𝑓, 𝑖, 𝑙, 𝑡 denoting facility, industry, location and time, 
respectively): 
 
ln 𝑇𝑓,𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 = 𝛽1 ln 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑓,𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑙,𝑡 + 𝛽3⃗⃗⃗⃗ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛽4⃗⃗⃗⃗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽5⃗⃗⃗⃗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜃𝑓,𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 
 
(1)  
𝑇𝑓,𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 is time-to-build of the facility (in months)
2, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑓,𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 is capacity of the facility (in volume and 
mass units), 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑙,𝑡 is local demand growth (proxied by yearly real GDP growth rate from 
the World Bank), and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠, 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠, and 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 are sets of dummies 
 
2 We follow the same methodology in past literature (Hawk et al., 2013; Pacheco-de-Almeida et al., 2015) to 
construct time to build (by following projects across issues of the Oil and Gas Journal and adding 90 days to both 
ends of the time interval defined by the first and last issues that the project appears) and discounting (using 
(1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇𝑓,𝑖,𝑙,𝑡)/𝑟) by an approximation of the average weighted average cost of capital in the oil and gas industry 
(calculated for firms in SIC codes 28 and 29, based on Compustat items as follows: 𝑟 =
(
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
) (
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛+𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡+𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
) +
(
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡+𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
) (
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡+𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛+𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡+𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
)).  
19 
 
for industry, geographic region and year, respectively. 𝜃𝑓,𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 is the residual which serves as the basis for 
our speed measure. After estimating this equation, we take 𝜃𝑓,𝑖,𝑙,𝑡, standardize it, take the average for each 
firm year, and collapse the measure to the firm year level. The resulting variable is our measure of the 
slowness of the firm, denoted 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑗,𝑡 for firm 𝑗 in year 𝑡. Thus, our measure of intrinsic firm 
slowness is time variant. 
For our predictions regarding valuable complementary assets, we follow precedent in the 
literature (Hawk et al., 2013) and use a proxy, LNG Tankers, constructed as a count of the number of 
LNG Tankers that a firm possesses.  Data for this variable were obtained from Tusiani and Shearer (2007) 
and the 2016 World LNG Report published by the International Gas Union. Firms with more LNG 
Tankers may have a head start on establishing a viable LNG chain, and may possess a set of valuable 
relationships in the industry or engineers and managers with LNG specific expertise, which may in turn 
make them more attractive to potential partner firms for an LNG project. Firms possessing such 
complementary assets may also have a greater reputation in the LNG market, which may in turn facilitate 
LNG contract negotiation and execution to facilitate the generation and maintenance of future revenue 
streams from the focal project. 
We also incorporated several controls to account for factors suggested by the literature on the 
decision between autonomous versus joint project development. Prior experience with partner-based or 
autonomous-based project development may affect firm learning and firms’ decisions to partner or go it 
alone as well as their abilities to address coordination challenges and other exchange hazards (e.g., Anand 
& Khanna, 2000; Colombo, 2003; Hagedoorn, Lorenz-Orlean, & van Kranenburg, 2009). We construct 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 and 𝐺𝑜 𝐼𝑡 𝐴𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 as counts of the number of past projects where the 
firm developed the project with a partner or alone, respectively, as of the prior year. To create measures 
that are as comprehensive as possible, we use all Oil and Gas Journal projects (LNG and non-LNG) in our 
data. We also control for firm size and age in case larger or older firms systematically approach the 
partner vs go alone decision differently than younger or smaller firms based on their abilities and 
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incentives to partner. We include 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒, constructed as the natural log of total sales of the firm from 
Compustat, and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒, constructed as the number of years since the firms’ founding (founding dates 
were obtained from Compustat and internet searches). Competitive pressures or increased demand could 
also induce firms to partner or go it alone (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). To account for competitive 
pressures, we construct Rival Entry, a count of the number of announced LNG projects from all other 
firms besides the focal firm as of the time of the project’s announcement. To account for differing 
demand conditions, we include Natural Gas Price, the Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price (in dollars per 
million Btu) from the EIA. In case firms from different parent industries approach the go it alone vs 
partner decision differently, we include dummies for 2 digit SIC membership of the parent company, for 
codes 13 (Oil and Gas Extraction), 29 (Petroleum and Coal Products), 49 (Electric and Gas Services) and 
other. We also include dummies for the geographic basin of the project (Atlantic, Pacific, Mideast) as 
well as LNG project type (liquefaction, gasification). We also control for other temporal effects that may 
shift the incentives to partner or go alone with the inclusion of a year time trend. 
Baseline Statistical Method 
The relationship between firm speed and the choice of whether to partner or go it alone can be 
expressed as the following logit model: 
 𝑃𝑟(𝐽𝑉 = 1) = 𝐹(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒋) (2)  
where 𝐹( ) is the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution, 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑗,𝑡 is our 
measure of the intrinsic slowness of the firm, and 𝑿𝒋 contains our remaining explanatory variables. We 
estimate equation 2 with maximum likelihood estimation while adjusting standard errors to be robust to 
clustering by firm. Hypothesis 1 suggests that slow firms are more likely to partner than go alone, leading 
to the theoretical expectation that 𝛽1 > 0. 
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Our theoretical development suggests that slow firms would like to partner with fast partner firms 
to overcome their own inability to move quickly, yet the question is why any fast partner firm would 
partner with a slow focal firm. The next element of our theoretical framework is the expectation that the 
ability of a slow firm to get a fast partner hinges on the slow firm possessing valuable complementary 
assets (measured by LNG Tankers) to bargain for partnerships with fast partners. It follows that slow 
firms without complementary assets should be unable to partner with fast firms. Without these valuable 
supporting assets to attract a fast partner firm, slow firms must settle for slow partners or go it alone. 
To test these ideas, we adjust our model specification to be a multinomial logit model. The 
dependent variable 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 is a categorical variable taking three values, capturing whether the focal firm 
partners with a fast partner (𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 = 𝐹𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟), slow partner (𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 = 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟), or 
goes it alone, which serves as the baseline category. As before, we estimate the model with maximum 
likelihood estimation while adjusting standard errors to be robust to clustering by firm. Given that 
employing a multinomial logit model requires the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
assumption to hold, we ran Hausman tests of the IIA hypothesis and found no evidence to reject it. In 
robustness checks, we also employ a variety of alternative model specifications (e.g., separate logit and 
random effects probit models) and continue to find similar results. To test the idea that slow firms bargain 
for fast partner firms in this manner (H2), we introduce the following contingency for the impact of a 
firm’s speed capabilities: 
 𝛽1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 (3)  
Substituting this contingency in the above multinomial logit model, we obtain the following 
expression we can use to test our theory: 
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 𝛼0𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ∙  𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑗,𝑡 (4)  
Following our theoretical arguments, we can test Hypotheses 2 as follows. First, consider the 
results for firms who partner with slow partner firms (where the dependent variable 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 =
𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟). For firms who partner with slow partners, we can expect 𝛼0 > 0 or 𝛼0 = 0 (capturing the 
scenario where slow firms without complementary assets must settle for slow partners and are thus more 
likely partner with them or go it alone) and 𝛼1 = 0 (slow firms with valuable complementary assets are 
not more likely to partner with slow firms since they have the ability to obtain fast partners). Next, 
consider the results for firms who partner with fast partner firms (where the dependent variable 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 = 𝐹𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟). For firms who partner with fast partners, we can expect 𝛼0= 0 (slow firms 
with no complementary assets cannot get fast partners), and 𝛼1 > 0 (slow firms with increasing amounts 
of valuable complementary assets are more likely to obtain partnerships with fast partners).  
Identification Strategy 
 In order to test our theory, our empirical objective is to estimate the impact of intrinsic speed 
capabilities on firms’ decision of whether to partner or go it alone, and we also wish to empirically 
explore slow firms’ preferences for fast partners and the role of complementary assets in enabling slow 
firms to bargain for and obtain fast partners. We thus needed to select an analytic approach that allows us 
to obtain an estimate of the causal effect between intrinsic firm slowness and partnership decisions in 
LNG projects. We also sought to address potential endogeneity concerns such as omitted variable bias, 
simultaneity and/or reverse causality as well as concerns that our measure of firm slowness may not be 
randomly assigned across firms.  
We thus use several analytic approaches to estimate the impact of intrinsic firm slowness on 
partnership decisions. We articulate our overall identification strategy in a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) 
in Figure 1 as a way to structure the analyses towards identification of a particular effect in a causal 
system (Morgan & Winship, 2014). As depicted in the DAG, our empirical objective is to identify a 
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causal effect between intrinsic firm slowness (labelled as variable D) and the decision to partner or go it 
alone (labelled as variable Y). 
 Our first identification strategy is to use regression, or identification by adjustment (depicted on 
the right side of the DAG in Figure 1). In this approach, we attempt to obtain a consistent estimate of firm 
slowness on firms’ partnership decisions by controlling for all other influences on our outcome variable 
of interest. We thus include a vector of control variables labelled as X in the DAG. We build in several 
features of our empirical design and take several steps to address potential endogeneity concerns. First, as 
noted above, we instrument for intrinsic firm slowness using unrelated projects, which helps to address 
simultaneity and/or reverse causality. It is important to note that our estimate of firm slowness is based on 
unrelated projects from LNG, which reduces the potential concern for reverse causality or simultaneity. 
This is because it is unlikely a particular partnership decision in a given LNG project would affect 
intrinsic firm slowness for a firm across a variety of unrelated projects worldwide in oil and gas. 
Moreover, the temporal structure of our measure of firm slowness further reduces this concern: since our 
slowness measure captures firm idiosyncratic project completion speed relative to the systematic average 
of projects completed in a given year, the firm slowness instrument has a lagged structure relative to the 
current partnership decision for the LNG project in the current year, further reducing reverse causality 
and/or simultaneity concerns. This empirical design also helps reduce potential correlation with the error 
term from omitted variable bias: if firm differences in expectation of the LNG market, for instance, are in 
the error term and are correlated with both our measure of firm slowness and the decision to go it alone or 
partner, we would have an endogeneity problem. Since our measure of firm slowness is based on 
unrelated projects, we avoid this potential correlation with the error term. Second, we include a vector of 
controls suggested from the literature that may affect the go it alone versus partner decision, reducing 
potential omitted variable bias. Third, we conduct additional analysis using random effects probits to 
further account for potential omitted variable bias from time invariant omitted firm heterogeneity. Fourth, 
we then conduct a series of robustness checks using additional controls and alternative variable 
definitions to further address the risk of omitted variable bias. 
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 Of course, an additional concern regarding identification of the impact of intrinsic firm slowness 
on partnership decisions is that intrinsic firm slowness is not randomly assigned across firms. As a 
consequence, our next identification strategy is to use treatment effects analysis, or identification by 
balancing (depicted on the left side of the DAG in Figure 1). In this approach, we define the treatment as 
a binary indicator set to 1 if the firm is intrinsically slow and 0 otherwise. We then approximate the 
experimental ideal by creating a balanced treatment group and control group using inverse probability 
weighting based on propensity scores estimated from a set of covariates (labelled S in the DAG) that 
predict the propensity to be intrinsically slow or not. If successfully balanced, the treatment group and 
control group should be as similar as possible except for their treatment status, allowing us to compare 
like with like. A second stage weighted regression is then estimated to obtain the marginal effect of 
slowness on the probability of whether to partner or go it alone. This estimate of the average treatment 
effect, if consistent with our main results, would provide further reassurance that we are obtaining a 
consistent estimate of the impact of intrinsic firm slowness on the ways that firm organize projects on an 
autonomous or collaborative basis. 
 Our next identification strategy is to use doubly robust estimation, which combines regression 
adjustment with identification by balancing. This approach (depicted on the bottom of the DAG in Figure 
1) continues to use identification by balancing on a set of variables predicting the propensity to be 
intrinsically fast, but it also includes a set of covariates as controls in the second stage regression. An 
attractive feature of this approach is its doubly-robust property, where a consistent estimate is achieved as 
long as one part of the model (selection or outcome) is correctly specified (Morgan & Winship, 2014).  
 In sum, we use a variety of identification strategies (regression adjustment, identification by 
balancing, and doubly robust estimation) to study the impact of intrinsic firm slowness on the go it alone 
versus partner decision. As depicted in the DAG in Figure 1, each method attempts to break potential 
unobservable interdependencies (labelled as U in the DAG) that could undermine identification of the 
impact of firm slowness on firm partnership decisions. By triangulating across multiple methods and 
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examining the theoretical relationship of interest using a variety of identification lenses, we seek to obtain 
a set of empirical evidence that convincingly tests our theory. 
RESULTS 
 We present descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix in Table 1. To examine whether 
collinearity is a concern, we checked variance inflation factors (VIFs). All VIF values were under 10, 
suggesting collinearity is at acceptable levels. Looking at Table 1, we see correlations consistent with 
theoretical expectations: Slowness is positively correlated with the decision to partner versus go it alone. 
The remaining correlations also yield interesting insights: larger, older and more experienced firms tend 
to partner more than go alone, and firms with greater complementary assets appear to be more likely to 
proceed autonomously than partner. Greater market prices and entry by rivals tends to also induce 
partnering rather than going alone. We next turn to estimation results from multivariate models to better 
address omitted variable bias concerns and obtain our main results. 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 We present logit and multinomial logit results in Table 2. Column I in Table 2 presents results for 
the logit model that examines the relationship between firm slowness and the decision to partner or go it 
alone. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find a positive and significant coefficient for slowness. Firm 
slowness makes it more likely a firm will elect to partner rather than go it alone. The marginal effect 
suggests that a one standard deviation increase in slowness is associated with a 0.113 increase in the 
predicted probability to partner rather than go alone, a 36.7% increase in the baseline predicted 
probability of 0.308. These results are supportive of our expectation that slow firms are generally electing 
to partner rather than take on an LNG investment project alone. 
 Columns II and III present baseline results for our multinomial logit model with no interaction 
terms. We then test H2 in Columns IV and V by introducing an interaction between slowness and 
complementary assets (as measured by LNG tankers) to examine whether the ability of slow firms to 
obtain fast partners hinges on the possession of supporting complementary assets. We first consider the 
results for firms who partner with slow partner firms in Column IV. As expected, we find a positive and 
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significant coefficient for slowness alone and an insignificant coefficient on the interaction between 
slowness and complementary assets (measured by LNG tankers). Slow firms with no complementary 
assets (captured by the coefficient on slowness alone) are electing to partner with slow partner firms. 
Additional complementary assets for slow firms (captured by the slowness * tankers interaction) do not 
increase the probability of slow firms partnering with slow partner firms (since they can attract fast 
partners). Next, we consider the results for firms who collaborate with fast partner firms in Column V. As 
before, the coefficient on slowness alone captures the case for slow firms with no complementary assets. 
As expected, we find an insignificant result for this coefficient, supporting our theoretical expectation that 
slow firms with no complementary assets are unable to partner with fast partner firms. However, we find 
a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction between slowness and complementary assets 
(measured by LNG tankers). This result suggests that each incremental additional LNG tanker 
significantly increases the probability that a slow firm collaborates with a fast partner firm.  
To help in interpreting the interaction between LNG tankers and slowness on the ability of firms 
to partner with fast versus slow partner firms within our multinomial logit model, we follow best practice 
in interpreting interaction effects in nonlinear models (Hoetker, 2007) and examine our results 
graphically. Accordingly, we plot in Figure 2 the marginal effects of slowness across values of LNG 
tankers (ranging from 0 tankers to 10 tankers) by partner type (Fast Partners versus Slow Partners). We 
also tabulate the marginal effects in Table 3. Figure 2 and Table 3 reinforce our theoretical expectation. 
On the left side of the graph firms have no LNG tankers (corresponding to 0 on the x axis). For firms that 
partner with slow firms, firms with no complementary assets have a positive marginal effect of .081 
(p=.085). Slow firms with no complementary assets are settling for partnering with slow partner firms. As 
we increase the complementary assets possessed by the focal firm, the marginal effect for partnering with 
slow firms approaches 0 and is no longer significant. These slow firms with complementary assets are no 
longer settling for partnering with slow partner firms. For firms that partner with fast firms, firms with no 
complementary assets have a marginal effect that is close to 0 (.007) and is insignificant (p=.841). These 
firms are unable to successfully partner with fast partners. However, as we increase the complementary 
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assets possessed by the firm, the marginal effect consistently becomes positive (ranging from .164 to 
.480) and strongly significant (all with p = .000). These results thus support our expectation that the 
ability of slow firms to collaborate with fast partner firms hinges on the possession of valuable 
complementary assets to attract a fast partner firm: with complementary assets, slow firms can 
successfully bargain for partnerships with fast partner firms. 
[Insert Figure 2 and Table 3 about here] 
Additional Analysis: Treatment Effect Analysis 
 Our goal is to identify a causal effect of firm slowness on the decision to go it alone or partner. 
While our theoretical arguments and the results above are suggestive of a causal relationship, one threat to 
causality is that firm slowness is not randomly distributed across firms. As discussed in the identification 
strategy section, we conduct additional analyses to model selection into firm slowness using treatment 
effect analysis techniques. In this approach, we define “treatment” as being slow or not, defined as 1 if a 
firm has a positive slowness value and 0 otherwise.  Treatment effect analysis then uses matching or 
weighting to create a treatment group and a control group that are as similar as possible to each other 
given the set of observable covariates and differ only in whether they receive treatment or not. A second 
stage weighted regression is then estimated to obtain the marginal effect of slowness on the probability of 
whether to partner or go it alone. This estimate of the average treatment effect, if consistent with our main 
results, would add clarity to whether our findings represent a consistent estimate of the impact of firm 
slowness on the decision to partner or go it alone. 
We use two treatment effect analysis techniques: propensity score inverse probability weighting 
(using the teffects ipw package in stata), and doubly robust estimation (using the teffects iwpra package in 
stata). In the first approach, a propensity score logit model is estimated to obtain estimates of the 
propensity of a firm to receive treatment. Propensity scores are then used for weighting to obtain balance 
between a treatment group and control group. We use our same set of covariates as in our initial analysis 
and obtain good balance between our treatment and control groups after weighting (a table displaying 
covariate balance between the treatment and control group is available upon request). To further verify 
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that covariate balance is achieved, we conducted a test for covariate balance between treated and control 
groups after weighting using the tebalance, overid command in stata, and we verified that we are unable 
to reject the null that the covariates are balanced (p=.98). A second stage linear probability regression is 
then estimated using the balanced treated and untreated groups. Table 4 Column I presents these results, 
where the coefficients from the linear probability model can be interpreted as percentage points. The 
estimate of both the average treatment effect (ATE) and the average treatment effect of the treated 
(ATET) are both supportive of our theory: a slow firm has a higher probability of partnering rather than 
going it alone by 35.4 percentage points (using the ATE) or 31.7 percentage points (using the ATET). In 
the second approach of doubly robust estimation, the same set of covariates are used also as controls in 
the second stage outcome regression. This inclusion gives the estimator a doubly robust property, where a 
consistent estimate is achieved if either the selection model or the outcome model is correct (even if one 
of them is mis-specified). Table 4 Column II displays the results of the doubly robust estimation, and the 
findings are supportive of our theory: a slow firm has a higher probability of partnering rather than going 
it alone by 33.9 percentage points (using the ATE) or 31.5 percentage points (using the ATET). These 
findings of the doubly robust estimation are consistent with our main results, providing additional 
reassurance that our main findings represent a consistent estimate of the impact of firm speed on 
partnership decisions. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Additional Robustness Checks 
 We conducted multiple additional robustness checks. First, we tried several alternative 
econometric specifications. We reran our results using separate logit models rather than the multinomial 
logit model, and we also ran random effect probit specifications to further address concerns about 
potential time invariant firm heterogeneity. Using either approach, the results and interpretations were 
similar to our main results. We also tried using different adjustments to our standard errors such as using 
White robust standard errors without clustering or unadjusted standard errors, and we obtained 
qualitatively similar results. The one finding that occasionally turned insignificant is the result from the 
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multinomial logit model that slow firms without complementary partnering are significantly more likely 
to partner with slow firms. In our main findings, the corresponding marginal effect for slow firms with no 
complementary assets was only significant at the 10% level as shown in Figure 2 and Table 3. This 
finding may be less robust than the remainder of our findings, suggesting that slow firms with little to 
offer potential partners may even have trouble attracting a slow partner firm and need to go it alone.  
We also conducted several robustness checks using alternative constructions of our variables or 
additional controls. Regarding our speed capability measure, we tried using an alternative construction 
using the average speed values of firms across our sample period, and we received results similar to our 
main results. Regarding our other explanatory variables, we examined alternative measures for firm size 
(using total assets), alliance experience and go it alone experience (using projects up through the current 
year besides the focal project, as well as experience measures based only on LNG projects), and rival 
entry (using lagged values), and this yielded results similar to the main findings. In case firm 
innovativeness affects the decision to partner or go alone in the construction projects we investigated, we 
also included R&D Intensity (R&D expense / total sales) as an additional control and continued to find 
similar results.  In case project size affects the decision to partner or go alone, we also included LNG 
project capacity as a control. While data availability reduced our sample size, we continued to find results 
consistent with our main findings.  As an additional check, we conducted regression diagnostics and 
identified influential outliers using Pearson residual, deviance residual, and Pregibon leverage values, and 
we continued to find results similar to our main results after excluding these observations. 
DISCUSSION 
Contributions and Implications 
 This study examines the impact of firms’ intrinsic speed capabilities on their decisions to develop 
large investment projects with alliances versus autonomously. As theoretically expected, we find that 
slow firms are generally more likely to partner than go it alone. A remaining question is why a fast 
partner firm would be willing to partner with a slow firm. We then find that the ability of slow firms to 
collaborate with fast partner firms hinges on the former’s possession of valuable complementary assets. 
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This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the literature that 
focuses on firm decisions between autonomous- versus partnership-based project development. Past 
research has shown that firms often partner to overcome deficiencies in resources and capabilities of 
various kinds (Shan, 1990; Mitchell & Singh, 1992; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Ahuja, 2000; 
Garrette et al., 2009). We build upon and extend this important stream of research by showing that firm 
speed capabilities matter in the decision to partner versus go it alone in project development. It would be 
valuable in future research to explore how intrinsic speed capabilities could substitute or complement 
other capabilities firms possess or access via partnerships and that have been featured in this literature. In 
addition, in our study, we focused on the focal firm choosing to develop a project autonomously or via a 
partnership. However, during alliance formation, there are other parties involved, and firms are often 
involved in portfolios of collaborations that are interdependent.  This suggests there are opportunities to 
investigate the implications of firm speed capabilities for other alliance decisions, including partner 
selection (e.g., Hitt et al., 2004), portfolio building (e.g., Hoffmann, 2007; Lavie, 2007), and so forth. 
Second, we contribute to the broader alliance literature by examining the motivation of entering 
alliances to move faster. Previous alliance research often invokes going faster as a motivation for 
alliances (Hamel et al., 1989; Ohmae, 1989; Bleeke & Ernst, 1991). However, this link between firm 
speed capabilities and whether to initiate an alliance or not has remained unexamined. We introduce the 
notion of intrinsic speed capabilities to the alliance literature, and we are the first to investigate and 
empirically show the role of intrinsic speed capabilities in the decision to develop an investment project 
autonomously versus via a partnership. It would be valuable to extend this work in a number of ways. A 
further research extension would be to examine the dynamics of capability access versus the acquisition 
and learning of speed capabilities within partnerships. Grant and Baden-Fuller (2004) indicate a 
distinction between accessing a partner firms’ knowledge or capabilities versus learning from the partner 
in order to acquire the knowledge or capabilities. It would be interesting to know if firms only access the 
speed capabilities of partner firms for the purposes of a focal project, or if they also enhance and learn 
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their own speed capabilities from the partnerships. The distinction between access and learning could be 
very valuable regarding our understanding of the development of intrinsic speed capabilities within firms.  
We also contribute more specifically to the perspective in the alliance literature of the needs 
versus attractiveness dynamic in alliances – that firms partner to satisfy their own needs, but they must 
also possess distinctive resources and capabilities to attract a suitable alliance partner (Eisenhardt et al., 
1996; Ahuja, 2000; Rothaermel et al., 2008; Garrette et al., 2009). Our results are in accord with this 
bargaining dynamic, where the ability of slow firms to obtain fast partners hinges on the possession of 
valuable complementary supporting assets. Future research on how firms specifically transact for speed 
capabilities alongside other resources and capabilities within alliance markets would be valuable in 
advancing competence-based perspectives on interfirm collaboration and the bargaining that takes place 
in such factor markets based upon collaborators’ outside options. 
An additional opportunity for future research stems from the fact that our study is silent regarding 
the performance implications of autonomously and jointly developed projects, both at the firm level and 
at the project level. Our focus has been on the antecedents of the decision of whether to partner or go it 
alone.  While we theoretically consider the differential speed benefits of alliances to firms, we do not 
examine the performance realized in alliances versus going it alone, whether the speed of project 
completion, efficiency, or returns. It would therefore be valuable to examine the ultimate performance 
consequences of slow firms partnering with other firms, of fast firms going it alone, etc.. Additionally, it 
would also be interesting to look at more proximate outcomes such as trust, stability, and other aspects of 
the relationships that collaborative agreements entail. Our focus has been at structural choices of whether 
to partner or not, and there may be valuable insights that can be obtained by looking at the processes of 
collaboration, how relationships evolve, and the relational and formal governance mechanisms that 
support complex projects beset with time pressures (e.g., Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Following partnerships 
longitudinally over time might give a richer understanding of the evolution of these relationships and 
coordination outcomes. A longitudinal study of these projects could also give insights regarding the speed 
of execution of projects over time, whether there are delays, and if speed capabilities help by affording 
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alliances temporal slack to facilitate adaptation as unforeseen contingencies surface. It may also be that 
speed capabilities are more helpful for particular projects with certain features or for particular kinds of 
firms or partnerships. 
Our study also contributes more broadly to the corporate strategy literature and the competitive 
strategy literature by integrating ideas from corporate strategy about boundary of the firm decisions with 
ideas from competitive strategy about firm speed capabilities (Hawk et al., 2013; Pacheco-de-Almeida et 
al., 2015). Our theory and evidence demonstrates one way in which firm speed matters in corporate 
strategy -- the selection of particular expansion modes. We argue and show that the ability to move 
quickly is an important consideration in how firms organize complex projects. Given our focus on firms’ 
partner versus go-it-alone choices, an interesting extension for future research would be to examine the 
role of firm speed capabilities in acquisitions as well as in how firms choose between different expansion 
modes like acquisitions versus alliances versus organic growth (Capron & Mitchell, 2009). Given our 
focus on firms’ partner versus go-it-alone choices in complex construction projects, it would be valuable 
and interesting to consider the role of speed capabilities in other contexts, including exploring these 
dynamics in markets for technology (Gans & Stern, 2003). In particular, it would be interesting to look at 
how speed affects these technology commercialization decisions where startups decide to partner with 
incumbents possessing downstream capabilities versus commercializing technologies themselves, just as 
incumbents face choices concerning open versus proprietary innovation strategies that might also reflect 
speed considerations. 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
  
 In addition to the research opportunities mentioned above, our study has other limitations that 
extensions to this research might address. First, we focused on one industrial context, liquefied natural gas 
and the oil and gas industry, which raises a question about the generalizability of our findings to other 
industries. LNG and oil and gas are industries with long resource accumulation lags, and we would expect 
our findings to generalize well to other industrial contexts where time to build is an important 
consideration. It would be interesting to extend our analysis to other settings where resource accumulation 
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lags may be shorter. Future research could look at similar dynamics in industries that change quickly due 
to short resource accumulation lags. It may also be interesting to extend our results to high technology 
industries with a fast rate of technological obsolescence. It could be that, if fixed investment is likely to 
become obsolete quickly, firm speed may be an even more important consideration when firms choose to 
develop projects autonomously versus with a partner. Another interesting facet regarding the 
generalizability of our results to other contexts would be to examine how country heterogeneity and cross 
border collaboration might affect the boundary of the firm choices we studied as well as the role of speed. 
It could also be interesting to look at international projects that present different coordination challenges 
and time considerations due to countries’ differing institutional environments. 
 An additional consideration regarding generalizability is that we restrict our focus to one 
particular type of alliance, joint ventures in oil and gas. Future research could look at different types of 
alliances such as equity partnerships or non-equity alliances that can present different capacity for 
coordination, administrative control, and incentives.  It would be interesting to consider if our results 
extend to other forms of collaboration and possibly do a more nuanced examination of governance 
structures that firms put in place to mitigate some of the inefficiencies of partnerships. It could be that 
firm speed (or lack of firm speed) may influence how firms structure and design their partnerships to 
facilitate coordination and cooperation with partner firms.  Research along these lines could be promising 
to join together competitive strategy and corporate strategy research in new ways, examine the role of 
speed capabilities along with other resources that firms leverage and access through partnerships, and 
provide new guidelines to executives making choices about how best to organize complex investment 
projects. 
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Figure 1: Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) depicting identification strategy 
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Figure 2: Marginal effect of slowness on predicted probability of obtaining slow or fast partners at various 
levels of complementary assets (proxied by number of LNG tankers) 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation table 
 
Variable Mean  S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Alliance .31 .46 0 1 1         
2. Slowness .14 .60 -2.00 1.68 0.27 1        
3. Tankers 2.03 3.12 0 10 -0.09 -0.10 1       
4. Partner Experience 20.97 16.84 0 62 0.08 0.02 0.37 1      
5. Go Alone Experience 56.81 42.50 1 177 0.05 -0.09 0.48 0.73 1     
6. Firm Size 10.67 1.69 4.96 12.51 0.06 -0.09 0.33 0.60 0.75 1    
7. Firm Age 78.25 42.89 5 140 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.46 0.45 0.62 1   
8. Rival Entry 30.46 13.97 0 50 0.06 0.09 -0.14 0.28 0.21 0.11 0.12 1  
9. Natural Gas Price 5.73 1.80 2.09 8.86 0.08 0.04 -0.09 0.28 0.17 0.09 -0.13 0.34 1 
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Table 2. Logit and Multinomial Logit Estimation Results  
 
 I II III IV V 
 Alliance 
Instead of 
Go It Alone 
Partner 
With 
Slow 
Partners 
Partner 
With 
Fast 
Partners 
Partner 
With 
Slow 
Partners 
Partner 
With 
Fast 
Partners 
Slowness 1.052** .844** 1.380** .903** .287 
 (.406) (.334) (.697) (.411) (.389) 
Tankers -.170 -.121 -.087 -.127 -.532** 
 (.123) (.277) (.247) (.276) (.232) 
Slowness    -.047 1.623*** 
    X Tankers    (.172) (.454) 
Partner .013 .038 .065 .038 .153* 
   Experience (.030) (.049) (.058) (.053) (.084) 
Go It Alone .010 -.004 -.007 -.002 -.024 
   Experience (.011) (.024) (.031) (.026) (.047) 
Firm Size -.234 -.462 -.970 -.556 -1.534** 
    (.353) (.760) (.670) (.768) (.685) 
Firm Age -.002 .003 .026* .004 .028 
    (.007) (.014) (.015) (.015) (.019) 
Rival Entry .009 .017 .003 .008 .061* 
    (.021) (.030) (.032) (.030) (.032) 
Natural Gas .187 .275 .149 .278 .060 
   Price (.167) (.264) (.406) (.250) (.590) 
LNG Basin Y Y Y Y Y 
   Dummies      
Project Type Y Y Y Y Y 
   Dummy      
Industry Y Y Y Y Y 
   Dummies      
Year Trend Y Y Y Y Y 
      
      
N 117 106 
-57.388 
.237 
106 
-52.585 
.301 
Log-L -59.192 
Pseudo R2 .180 
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
Note. Results reported are from estimation of logit and multinomial logit models. For the multinomial logit, going 
alone is the benchmark dependent variable category. Standard errors robust to clustering by firm are reported in the 
parentheses. LNG geographic basin dummies, a LNG project type dummy, parent industry dummies, a year trend, 
and a constant are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. The sample size difference 
between the logit and multinomial logit results is due to a lack of speed data (from our estimation of equation 1) for 
several partner firms. 
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Table 3. Marginal effect of slowness predicting partner type, at various levels of complementary assets 
(proxied by LNG tankers)  
 
 I II III IV 
Predicting 
Partner With 
Complementary 
Assets 
(Tankers) 
Slowness 
Marginal 
Effect 
dy/dx 
Delta- 
Method 
Std. 
Err. 
P - 
Value 
Slow Partner 0 .082 .047 .085 
Slow Partner 1 .039 .032 .227 
Slow Partner 2 .005 .029 .869 
Slow Partner 3 -.018 .024 .464 
Slow Partner 4 -.031 .023 .164 
Slow Partner 5 -.037 .027 .175 
Slow Partner 6 -.035 .036 .324 
Slow Partner 7 -.030 .039 .436 
Slow Partner 8 -.024 .036 .505 
Slow Partner 9 -.018 .031 .551 
Slow Partner 10 -.014 .027 .610 
Fast Partner 0 .007 .037 .841 
Fast Partner 1 .164 .046 .000 
Fast Partner 2 .298 .061 .000 
Fast Partner 3 .386 .057 .000 
Fast Partner 4 .439 .053 .000 
Fast Partner 5 .470 .062 .000 
Fast Partner 6 .480 .089 .000 
Fast Partner 7 .471 .108 .000 
Fast Partner 8 .438 .115 .000 
Fast Partner 9 .395 .091 .000 
Fast Partner 10 .364 .057 .000 
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Table 4. Treatment Effects Analysis 
 
 I II  
 Inverse Probability 
Weighted Propensity 
Score Estimation 
Doubly Robust 
Estimation  
 
Slowness ATE .354*** .339***  
(Average (.071) (.071)  
Treatment Effect)    
    
Slowness ATET .317*** .315***  
(Average (.072) (.073)  
Treatment Effect 
on the Treated) 
   
    
   
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
Note. Results are from a second stage linear probability model explaining the probability of partnering 
versus going it alone. Estimations are done using the teffects ipw and teffects ipwra packages in stata. 
Coefficients in the linear probability model can be interpreted as percentage points. For instance, a 
coefficient of .354 implies that firms receiving the treatment of being slow have an increased probability 
of partnering over going it alone by 35.4 percentage points. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
